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I. INTRODUCTION 
In earlier generations, statutory schemes were not nearly as complex and intricate 
as those administered by agencies today.  Seventy years ago, the instructions to complete 
a tax return were two pages.  Today, those same instructions are 157 pages, more than 
double the number of pages of instructions since 1985, the year before that last time that 
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2the Tax Code was simplified.1 The Internal Revenue Code itself is approximately 1.5 
million words long,2 and in excess of 9,500 pages of text, not counting five volumes of 
regulations.3
Courts have much less familiarity with complex statutory schemes with only 
infrequent ability to understand the intricacies of a specific aspect of that scheme as may 
arise through litigation.  Agencies, on the other hand, are focused on the resolution of 
specific issues, but in the context of its impact on an entire statutory scheme because the 
responsibility of an agency is to administer and enforce a statutory scheme over which it 
contributes substantial expertise.   
 Agencies make policy choices and courts make decisions.  Those decisions should 
respect the policy choices considered by agencies in their capacity as experts in a 
 
1 See Instructions for Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, General Instructions, Schedules A & 
B, C, D, E, F, H, J, R, SE (2005). 
2 See Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 107th Cong., Study of the Overall State of the Federal Tax 
System and Recommendations for Simplification, Pursuant to Section 8022(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 (vol. I), 4 (Comm. Print 2001). Since 2001, the number of words has grown considerably.   
3 The Complete Internal Revenue Code - All the Income, Estate & Gift, Employment, Excise, Procedure 
and Administrative Provisions, Research Institute of America, (December 2004); Federal Tax Regulations - 
Complete text of all final, temporary and proposed Treasury Regulations pertaining to income tax, estate 
tax, gift tax, employment tax, procedure, administration, and excise taxes, Research Institute of America, 
(January 2004). 
Members of Congress claim even greater complexity.  See Mark Kennedy (R-MN), Much-Needed Tax 
Relief, http://markkennedy.house.gov/cgi-data/news/files/12.shtml (April 8, 2003) (“The federal tax code, 
with its 44,000 pages, 5.5 million words, and 721 different forms, is a patchwork of complexity and a 
testament to confusion over common sense.”); Dave Hobson (R-OH), Working for Tax Relief and Fairness, 
http://www.house.gov/hobson/taxweek.htm (April 11, 2000) (“[T]he current tax code, which at 1.3 million 
pages is twice the length of Tolstoy's War and Peace”) (April 11, 2000); John Hostettler (R-IN), Taxing 
America’s Patience, http://www.house.gov/hostettler/Issues/Hostettler-issues-1997-04-08-taxes-and-irs.htm
(April 8, 1997) ("the Internal Revenue Code and regulations add up to one million words and is nearly 
seven times the length of the Bible"); Vito Fossella (R-NY), Press Announcement: Outraged Over 
Shocking Abuses By IRS, Fossella Cosponsors Bill to Abolish Tax Code, 
http://www.house.gov/fossella/Press/pr_50698a.htm (May 6, 1998) (“[T]he tax code runs 17,000 pages and 
contains a mind-boggling 5.5 million words. By way of comparison, War and Peace is only 1,444 pages 
and the Bible checks in at 1,291 pages”). 
 
3specialized area of law.  The manner in which those policy choices are respected is 
through deference to agency interpretations.   
 Deference, then, is a choice between an agency charged with administering a 
statute and judicial independence in reviewing policy choices by agencies.  In many 
cases, if a statute does not identify a particular result, an agency attempts to fill the gaps 
in the statute through formal and informal guidance.  The question of deference considers 
the ambiguity and either directs a court to defer to an agency interpretation or to 
substitute its judgment for the judgment of an agency if it believes that its reading of a 
statute better fills the gaps left by Congress than the interpretation by an agency. 
 In 1984, the United States Supreme Court decided Chevron,4 determining that a 
reasonable interpretation of an agency should trump independent judicial determination.  
At the time, this decision was viewed as a path breaking decision in administrative law.  
Seventeen years later, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Mead,5 declined to extend 
the same type of deference under Chevron to more informal agency pronouncements.6
Instead, Mead resurrected the long-forgotten, intermediate standard of deference 
originally announced by the Supreme Court in 1944 in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.7
Combined with Chevron, Skidmore directs courts along a sliding scale of deference in an 
effort to quantify the degree to which courts defer to agency interpretations of law, with 
the quantity of deference ranging from de novo review to deference based on 
 
4 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
5 United States v. Mead Corporation, 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
6 United States v. Mead Corporation, 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001). 
7 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
4persuasiveness to deferring to the views of an agency as long as its interpretation is 
reasonable.   
 As agencies disseminate more informal guidance and more frequently, the 
discretion given to agency determinations becomes more and more significant.  For 
example, the following table lists four of the 39 distinct categories of guidance issued to 
taxpayers by the Internal Revenue Service and the number of each specific type of 
informal guidance issued for the last five years.8
Year 
Revenue 
Rulings9
Revenue 
Procedures10 Notices11 Announcements12 
Private Letter 
Rulings13 
8 Inventory of IRS Guidance Documents -- A Draft, 88 TAX NOTES (TA) 305 (July 17, 2000). 
9 Revenue rulings describe a set of hypothetical facts, apply those facts to the law, and offer a legal 
conclusion for all taxpayers concerning what the Internal Revenue Service believes the result would be in 
such a situation. See Rev. Proc 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814.  “Revenue rulings . . . are published to provide 
precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases, and may be cited and relied upon for that purpose.”   
Id. Moreover, revenue rulings involve substantive law and reflect conclusions responsive to the facts 
addressed in the ruling.  Id. Finally, a revenue ruling is an official interpretation by the Service and is 
published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.  Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(6). 
10 Revenue procedures describe a “statement of procedure that affects the rights and duties of taxpayers or 
other members of the public under the Code and related statutes or information that, although not 
necessarily affecting the rights and duties of the public, should be a matter of public knowledge.”  Treas. 
Reg. § 606.601(d)(2)(i)(b). 
11 Notices describe a “public announcement that may contain guidance that involves interpretations of the 
Code or other provisions of the law.  Notices may also be used for materials that would be appropriate for 
an announcement but for the need to preserve the guidance in the Cumulative Bulletin.  For example, 
notices can be used to relate what regulations will say in situations where the regulations may not be 
published in the immediate future.”  Internal Revenue Manual 30.15.10.  Moreover, a taxpayer may rely on 
a notice to avoid penalties.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6661-3(b)(2). 
12 An announcement is a public pronouncement that can be used to summarize the law or regulations 
without making an independent, substantive interpretation.  An announcement can be used to relate what 
regulations will say in situations where the regulations may not be published in the immediate future or 
may be used to notify taxpayers of the possibility of an election or the existence of a deadline to make an 
election.  Announcements are not published in the Cumulative Bulletin.  Moreover, a taxpayer may rely on 
an announcement to avoid penalties.  Revenue Ruling 90-91. 
13 A private letter ruling is a written determination issued to a taxpayer by the Internal Revenue Service that 
interprets and applies the tax laws to the specific set of facts provided by the taxpayer.  Rev. Proc. 2005-1, 
2005-1 I.R.B. 1.  Private letter rulings are issued to specific taxpayers and are binding on the Internal 
Revenue Service only with respect to the taxpayer that requested the private letter ruling.  Rev. Proc. 2005-
1, 2005-1 I.R.B. 1.  Private letter rulings are often utilized by taxpayers to provide a degree of certainty 
regarding the tax consequences of a proposed transaction and are generally requested prior to completing 
the transaction.  See Treas. Reg. § 601.201(b)(1) (Internal Revenue Service “issues rulings on prospective 
transactions and on completed transactions before the return is filed”).  A taxpayer may not rely on a 
private letter ruling issued to another taxpayer.  26 U.S.C. §  6110(k)(3).   
52001 6614 6115 8416 12417 1,99018 
2002 9119 7520 11521 8022 2,01123 
2003 12824 8625 8126 8927 1,79228 
2004 11329 7330 8331 10332 1,81033 
2005 7934 7835 10136 8937 168638 
14 See 2001-53 I.R.B. 637. 
15 See 2001-53 I.R.B. 653. 
16 See 2001-53 I.R.B. 642. 
17 See 2001-52 I.R.B. 630. 
18 Based on a search of Westlaw database FTX-PLR from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2001. 
19 See 2002-52 I.R.B. 991. 
20 See 2002-52 I.R.B. 997. 
21 See 2002-52 I.R.B. 999. 
22 See 2002-51 I.R.B. 980. 
23 Based on a search of Westlaw database FTX-PLR from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002. 
24 See 2003-52 I.R.B. 1247. 
25 See 2003-50 I.R.B. 1211. 
26 See 2003-51 I.R.B. 1223. 
27 See 2003-52 I.R.B. 1256. 
28 Based on a search of Westlaw database FTX-PLR from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003. 
29 See 2004-52 I.R.B. 1024. 
30 See 2004-51 I.R.B. 999. 
31 See 2004-52 I.R.B. 1030. 
32 See 2004-52 I.R.B. 1036. 
33 Based on a search of Westlaw database FTX-PLR from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2004. 
34 See 2005-52 I.R.B. 1197. 
35 See Rev. Proc. 2005-78, 2005 WL 3257518 (Dec. 19, 2005). 
36 See 2005-52 I.R.B. 1219. 
37 See 2005-50 I.R.B. 1149. 
38 Based on a search of Westlaw database FTX-PLR from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2005. 
6Like the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, the intermediate persuasiveness 
standard was created in 1944 as a political solution and not a comprehensive evaluation 
of administrative efficiency or a debate over the fundamental role of the expansive 
administrative structure born of New Deal politics.  The result was a political 
compromise between the proponents and opponents of the New Deal within the current 
system – a system which viewed the role of the court system as sole interpreters of the 
law.   
 The Supreme Court was not immune from the politics of the 1930s and 1940s and 
the 1944 intermediate deference standard was based on an open-ended factor analysis 
used by the courts when the views of an agency paralleled the views of the court.  In 
other words, the system articulated by the Supreme Court favored judicial independence 
over administrative discretion.   
 There are, of course, a number of academic articles devoted to judicial review of 
agency interpretation of statutes.39 This paper, however, focuses on the methodology 
courts use in determining the extent to which informal agency determinations should be 
given judicial deference.  The factors articulated by the Supreme Court in 1944 to 
provide intermediate deference were arguably consistent with the state of the law in 1944 
but are now based on considerations that no longer conform to a modern view of the law.  
These factors skew the deference issue in favor of de novo determinations by the 
 
39 See e.g. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND.
L. REV. 1443 (2005); Torrey A. Cope, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Jurisdiction After 
Mead, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327 (2005); Ryan C. Morris, Substantially Deferring to Revenue Rulings After 
Mead, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 999 (2005); Cooley R. Howarth, Jr., United States v. Mead Corp.:  More 
Pieces for the Chevron/Skidmore Deference Puzzle, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 699 (2002); Michael P. Healy, 
Spurious Interpretation Redux:  Mead and the Shrinking Domain of Statutory Ambiguity, 54 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 673 (2002); Russell L. Weaver, The Emperor Has No Clothes:  Christensen, Mead and Dual 
Deference Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 173 (2002); John F. Coverdale, Court Review or Tax Regulations 
and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 37 (1995). 
7judiciary at the expense of deference to agencies whose expertise and experience allow 
them to consider the entirety of a statutory scheme. 
 Finally, the persuasiveness intermediate level of deference – a standard in name 
only – should be abandoned in favor of an intermediate standard that considers 
appropriate factors in light of the advances in the law.  Moreover, the intermediate 
deference standard should provide a more meaningful deference standard beyond mere 
persuasiveness to be applied by the courts in reviewing informal determinations of 
agencies charged with administering a body of law under the scope of their expertise. 
 This article considers informal guidance by the Internal Revenue Service as the 
basis for application of an intermediate deference doctrine that is equally applicable to 
other administrative agencies.  In fact, the tax arena expands the consideration of 
deference beyond the three sphere progression of no deference, Skidmore deference, and 
Chevron deference.  This fourth possibility resonates from the 1979 Supreme Court 
decision in National Muffler Dealers Association, Inc. v. U.S.40 and is a second type of 
intermediate deference fitting on the sliding deference scale between Skidmore and 
Chevron.
National Muffler follows the similar factor process in determining whether 
deference is due to an administrative agency.  These factors provide for a more 
appropriate methodology emerges for a determination of the amount of deference due to 
an administrative agency and a more appropriate standard is created for a determination 
of the amount of deference due to informal agency guidance.   
II. THE SLIDING SCALE OF DEFERENCE – SKIDMORE TO CHEVRON 
40 440 U.S. 472 (1979). 
8A. DEFERENCE STANDARDS 
In general, there are three levels of deference a court may give agency 
determinations.  One side of the spectrum provides no deference to an agency 
determination.  At the opposite end is Chevron deference which accords broad deference 
to agency determinations.  The recently re-energized intermediate step provides for 
deference under Skidmore v. Swift &. Co.41 
B. DEFERENCE UNDER SKIDMORE 
In Skidmore, seven employees of the Swift & Co. packing plant at Fort Worth, 
Texas, brought an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act42 to recover overtime, 
liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees, totaling approximately $77,000.43 The District 
Court rendered judgment denying this claim, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed.44 Central to the reasoning of both the District Court and the Fifth Circuit was 
the Administrator’s interpretation of “working time” employed by the Administrator in 
Interpretive Bulletin No. 13.45 
Under Skidmore, informal pronouncements such as rulings, interpretations, and 
agency opinions are entitled to deference based on “the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power 
to control.”46 Seventy years after Skidmore, the Supreme Court in Mead expanded the 
 
41 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
42 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 
43 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 135 (1944). 
44 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 136 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1943). 
45 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 136 F.2d 112, 113 (5th Cir. 1943). 
46 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
9open-ended factor analysis under Skidmore to include “the merit of [the] writer’s 
thoroughness, logic, and expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other 
sources of weight.”47 The result of Skidmore deference is that informal agency guidance 
is “not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, [but] do constitute a body 
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort 
for guidance.”48 Thus, “[t]he default rule [is] one of independent judicial judgment. 
Deference to the agency interpretation [is] appropriate only if a court could identify some 
factor or factors that would supply an affirmative justification for giving special weight to 
the agency views.”49 
Skidmore, as opposed to Chevron, allows the reviewing court to choose a better 
rule, even if the agency interpretation is reasonable.50 This rationale is confirmed by 
Christensen v. Harris County51 in which the Supreme Court adopted the long-dormant 
and reemerging Skidmore deference doctrine, rejecting the agency’s view and adopting a 
view that it thought reflected a better reading of the statute.52 As a result, intermediate 
deference is determined based on array of factors developed by the Supreme Court in 
 
47 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 220. 
48 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
49 Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 972 (1992). 
50 Interpretations by courts are nonetheless enforced by invoking an administrative agency to make a 
decision of the courts effective.  Roscoe Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action, 27 INTERNATIONAL J. 
OF ETHICS 150, 153 (1917). 
51 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
52 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 228 
(“a court is free to accept or reject a position set forth in a revenue ruling on the basis of its evaluation of 
such factors as “the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and . . . 
the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”).  Professor Ellen P. Aprill refers to this dichotomy as a 
choice of interpretative voices in which, under Chevron, if Congress has not spoken on a particular issue, 
the interpretative voice of an administrative agency fills the void while under Skidmore, the abyss is filled 
by the judicial voice that has final interpretative authority.  Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretative Voice, 38 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. ___ (2006), Loyola Law School (Los Angeles) Legal Research Series, Research Paper 
2005-3, http://ssrn.com/abstract=665829, at 2-3. 
10
Skidmore and supplemented by subsequent Supreme Court decisions in Mead and 
Christensen.
C. WEAKNESSES OF SKIDMORE INTERMEDIATE DEFERENCE 
Skidmore is problematic for a number of reasons.  First, it is non-limiting.  
Skidmore provides little guidance to the courts and little refuge for agencies.  Under 
Skidmore, an agency throws darts at moving targets with its aim insufficient to produce a 
predictable result.  This open ended factor test ensures that an interpretation of a court 
and not an administrative agency takes precedence because the consideration of 
undefined, limitless elements justifies any result that a court reaches.53 Under Skidmore, 
deference has to be earned by an administrative agency by satisfying a list of undefined 
factors. As such, Skidmore deference is a matter of judicial discretion.   
Second, even if an agency determination was given deference under the 
enumerated and undefined factors of Skidmore, it is deference in name but not in practice.  
Deference is, in a sense, a judicial gloss on an agency interpretation, emphasized by a 
court when its interpretation coincides with the interpretation of the agency and de-
emphasized, avoided, or ignored when its interpretation is contrary to an agency 
interpretation.54 In many cases, the factors serve as a guise upon which a court can rely if 
the factors produce the “correct result.”55 
53 See Missouri ex rel. S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 295 (1923) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
54 Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia:  The Unproven Case of Increased Judicial Deference 
to Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 637, 644-45 (1996).  See Russell L. Weaver, A Foolish Consistency is 
the Hobgoblin of Little Minds, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 529, 553 (1992).  See also Quintin Johnstone, An 
Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1954) (courts “pull respectable-
sounding rules to justify any possible result.”); Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference:  Conceptualizing 
Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1105-06 (2001) (inviting 
“ad hocery by lower courts”); Scoot H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron:  A Defense of Seminole Rock 
11
Skidmore provides deference to an agency if the agency can persuade a court that 
its interpretation is correct.  The power to persuade, however, is exactly what every 
litigant attempts to do at trial, at oral argument, and on brief.56 The result is that 
Skidmore deference is exactly that which is accorded a litigant – nothing more and 
nothing less.57 While Skidmore has an open-ended factor analysis, a number of these 
considerations ought to be eliminated as outdated and should not be utilized in a 
reformulated intermediate deference standard.  Finally, the enumerated factors considered 
in Skidmore are tilted against allowing any deference that would otherwise be due to an 
administrative agency. 
1. THE FLAWED FACTOR ANALYSIS OF SKIDMORE  
Under Skidmore, informal pronouncements such as rulings, interpretations, and 
agency opinions are entitled to deference based on a number of factors.  In 1944,   
 
Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 59 (2000) (the “division of 
interpretation of statutory responsibility . . . would be undermined if courts reviewed an agency’s informal 
regulatory interpretation under Skidmore”).  
55 Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia:  The Unproven Case of Increased Judicial Deference 
to Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 637, 644-45 (1996) (“The precise verbal formulation used by a court 
is mere window-dressing that does not have any effect on the ultimate resolution of the case.”); Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Legislative Reform of Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1110, 1110 (1995) (“a 
court can often write an opinion that reverses a major agency action as easily as it can write an opinion that 
upholds the same action.”).  See also Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1391 (1995). 
56 Professor Aprill argues that, while the deference accorded an agency under Skidmore is uncertain, it 
“seems to require at a minimum that courts at least consider the possibility of deference to [an 
administrative agency] by engaging in an analysis of the factors that could lead to accepting the 
administrative interpretation.”  Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretative Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. ___ (2006), 
Loyola Law School (Los Angeles) Legal Research Series, Research Paper 2005-3, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=665829, at 28. 
57 See Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REV. 841 
(1992).  The Internal Revenue Service is non-neutral party and is expected to favor a construction for the 
collection of revenue while private parties are biased against construction for the collection of revenue.  As 
a result, courts provide neutral forums in which either party has an opportunity to persuade the court of the 
correctness of its version of statutory construction.  Id. at 856.  See also Randolph E. Paul, Use and Abuse 
of Treasury Regulations in Statutory Construction, in Studies in Federal Taxation No. 3, at 420-21 (1940); 
Note, Judicial Review of Regulations and Rulings Under the Revenue Acts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1163 
(1939). 
12
Skidmore created a non-limiting factor analysis that considered “the thoroughness evident 
in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power 
to control.”58 In Mead, the Supreme Court expanded the previously vague standards to 
include consideration of “the merit of [the] writer’s thoroughness, logic, and expertness, 
its fit with prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight.”59 
Under Skidmore, two facts should be irrelevant:  (1) the consistency with earlier 
and later pronouncements, and (2) the “fit” of the guidance with prior agency 
interpretations.60 These two factors drive many decisions to counsel against 
administrative deference and should be abandoned.61 However, these two factors should 
not be relevant to the deference inquiry because both factors no longer conform to a 
modern view of the law.  As Justice Scalia notes –  
[T]here is no longer any justification for giving "special"' deference to 
"'long-standing and consistent"' agency interpretations of law. That 
venerable principle made a lot of sense when we assumed that both court 
and agency were searching for the one, permanent, "correct"' meaning of 
the statute; it makes no sense when we acknowledge that the agency is 
free to give the statute whichever of several possible meanings it thinks 
most conducive to accomplishment of the statutory purpose. Under the 
latter regime, there is no apparent justification for holding the agency to its 
first answer, or penalizing it for a change of mind.62 
While there may be no value to long and consistent agency interpretations, the 
problem arises when the agency does reverse course.  Such a change of course, in effect, 
 
58 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
59 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 220. 
60 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
61 See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981). 
62 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 
(1989). 
13
eliminates agency discretion.  Chevron recognized it.63 Skidmore did not because, at the 
time Skidmore was decided, consistency was paramount but its importance continues 
today because of osmosis rather than theoretical underpinnings.64 While deference to 
consistent interpretations over an extended period of time offers certainty and 
predictability, such considerations should be outweighed by the need of agencies to react 
in a flexible manner based on market considerations.65 Moreover, an abuse of discretion 
 
63 In upholding a regulation that differed dramatically from a prior regulation, the Court in Chevron did not 
negatively view the change:  “The fact that the agency has from time to time changed its interpretation of 
the term "source" does not . . . lead us to conclude that no deference should be accorded the agency's 
interpretation of the statute.  An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.  On the 
contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the 
wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”  Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. at 863-64.  In addition, the Supreme Court in Chevron flatly rejected the consistent 
interpretations of an agency over an extended period of time was entitled to more deference than newly 
issued interpretations. Id. Moreover, the Chevron Court concluded that an agency should be able to 
disregard judicial interpretation based on policy choice.  Id. at 864.  See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 
(1991) (deference given to agency interpretation that reversed previous agency policy); Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237 (1985) (deference to inconsistent 
interpretation by agency).  See also Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 698-99 (1991).  While 
Chevron finds irrelevant inconsistent interpretations of a statute inasmuch as deference to agency 
determinations are unaffected by prior interpretations, a few post-Chevron cases found Chevron irrelevant.  
Cf. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994) (change in agency policy merits less deference 
that consistent policy); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 537 (1992) (no deference if agency 
interpretation inconsistent with prior interpretation by Court); Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary 
Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116 (1990) (same); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) ("[a]n 
agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is 
'entitled to considerably less deference' than a consistently held agency view.").  Justice Stevens dissented 
in Rust v. Sullivan, principally on grounds of inconsistency, noting a change from the “consistent 
interpretation accorded the statute by the responsible cabinet officers during four different Presidencies and 
18 years.”  Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 220 (1991).  Accordingly, Justice Stevens concluded that the 
inconsistent interpretation by the Secretary was not a permissible construction of the statute at issue.  Id. at 
221-22. 
64 Pre-Chevron cases followed the Skidmore rationale in penalizing an agency’s discretion if an agency 
altered a prior position.  North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12 (1982) (change in 
position several times militates against deference to agency interpretation, especially considering position 
changed during course of litigation); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 n.13 
(1979) (change in position “substantially diminishes the deference to [the agency’s] present interpretation 
of the statute); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858-59 (1975) (because the 
position of the SEC “flatly contradicts what appears to be a rather careful statement of the Commission’s 
views in a recent release . . . we accord no special weight to its views.”).  But see Andrus v. Sierra Club,
442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (Court deferred to agency interpretation notwithstanding that agency changed its 
interpretation).    
65 Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REV. 841, 881 
(1992).  See Erwin N. Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REV. 398-408-10 
(1941).  See also Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV.
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standard to alter retroactively an agency interpretation eliminates arbitrary agency 
action.66 
D. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN BLACKSTONE AND CONSISTENCY IN DECISIONS 
Skidmore was decided at a time when Blackstone’s theories were still very much 
lurking in the shadows of American judicial philosophy.  More specifically, Blackstone 
provided a sharp line of demarcation between the role of the lawmaker and the role of an 
administrative agency wherein it is Congress and not an administrative agency that 
prescribes the law.67 As a result, by its very nature, administrative determinations cannot 
be the law and cannot alter the law.68 Instead, a change in administrative position 
determines what the law always was and how it was always meant to be interpreted.69 
1179, 1198 (1990); Randolph E. Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction, in 
Studies in Federal Taxation No. 3, at 430 (1940).   
66 Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Does the Internal Revenue Service Have a Duty to Treat Similarly-
Situated Taxpayers Similarly?, 74 U. CINN. L. REV. ___  (2006). 
67 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE , COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69-79 (1765).  See 
Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 73 (1965) (It is “Congress, not the Commissioner, that prescribes the 
tax laws.”). 
68 See David W. Ball, Retroactive Application of Treasury Rules and Regulations, 17 N.M. L. REV. 139, 
142 (1987).  This is not to say that a law should be modified retroactively under this theory but only 
interpretations of law that define what the law always was.  In the case of a modification of law by one 
authorized to change the law – i.e. Congress, then such changes should be applied prospectively only 
because “it is impossible that a party could foresee that an action, innocent when it was done, should be 
afterwards converted to guilt by a subsequent law:  he had therefore no cause to abstain from it; and all 
punishment for not abstaining must of consequence be cruel and unjust.  All laws should therefore made to 
commence in futuro, and be notified before their commencement; which is implied in the term 
‘prescribed.’”  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 46 
(1803).  As applied in the United States, Article I of the Constitution provides that “[n]o . . . ex post facto 
Law shall be passed.”  U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 9. 
69 According to Blackstone, “[f]or if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is 
declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it was not law.”  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 70 (1803).  See David W. Ball, Retroactive 
Application of Treasury Rules and Regulations, 17 N.M. L. REV. 139, 142 (1987). 
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 According to this theory, the statute is the law while administrative guidance 
provides a mechanism to interpret law.70 This theory caused havoc every time an 
administrative agency would rethink a position inasmuch as “an incorrect interpretation 
was . . . a nullity [such that] a correct interpretation necessarily operated retroactively to 
the date of adoption of the legislation.”71 
The result of this application was that it caused significant hardship on those who 
considered the current state of the law in conducting their affairs only to subsequently 
determine that, based on a change in agency position, the prior interpretation on which 
they relied was a nullity and that the newly minted correct interpretation necessarily 
operated retroactively to the date that the statute became effective.72 Necessarily, then, 
consistency in agency position was favored by the courts in light of the significant 
disadvantage created by a reversal of an agency position by those who incorrectly 
believed that they have resolved a matter based on a prior administrative determination.73 
Skidmore derives from time when consistency was thought necessary to avoid the 
harsh results of retroactive application.  After all, Skidmore was decided in 1944 and 
 
70 See David W. Ball, Retroactive Application of Treasury Rules and Regulations, 17 N.M. L. REV. 139, 
142 (1987). 
71 Paul Gordon Hoffman, Limits on Retroactive Decision Making by the Internal Revenue Service:  
Redefining Abuse of Discretion under § 7805(b), 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 529, 531 (1976). 
72 David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative 
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 933 (1965).  See Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311, 317 (9th Cir. 
1962).  Based on this theory, retroactive application is necessary; otherwise one would be entitled to 
demand an incorrect interpretation of law, thereby obtaining a benefit not intended by the law as 
promulgated by Congress as lawmaker. 
73 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 70 (1803) (“The 
doctrine of the law then is this:  that precedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust:  
for through their reason be not obvious at first view, yet we owe such a deference to former times, as not to 
suppose that they acted wholly without consideration.”).  Such a perception ties neatly with Blackstone’s 
view of custom.  For a custom to be a legality, it must be used for a long period of time, must have 
continued, and must be consistent with each other custom.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 76-79 (1803).   See also H.R. REP. NO. 350, 67th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1921) (causing the Internal Revenue Service to reopen “thousands of settled cases”). 
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Blackstone’s theory that “the law is the law” was not rejected by the Supreme Court until 
1965 in Linkletter v. Walker.74 
Blackstone’s theory and its attraction to consistency provided a solid foundation 
for Skidmore. While the Skidmore consistency factor was eminently reasonable in 1944, 
it no longer serves the purpose for which it was created.  The impact of Blackstone 
permeates through Skidmore but, a mere two years after Blackstone’s theory was 
rejected, the Supreme Court, in a judicial deference case of Correll v. United States,75 
failed to cite Skidmore or mention the Skidmore factors, instead beginning to formulate 
an intermediate deference standard announced eleven years later by the Supreme Court in 
National Muffler.76 Recently, however, the Supreme Court appears to have resurrected 
Skidmore long after it was properly buried.77 
Consistency of an agency position, or lack thereof, should not influence whether 
an agency’s interpretation is or is not given deference.78 The negative impact of a change 
in position deprives an agency of the flexibility necessary based on updated or new 
 
74 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628 (1965), overruled on other grounds, Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 
U.S. 314 (1987).  In Linkletter, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether the rule announced 
by the Court in Mapp v. Ohio should apply retroactively.  Id. at 636.  In Mapp, the Supreme Court 
determined that illegally seized evidence that violated the constitutional rights of a defendant was not 
admissible in a prosecution of the defendant in state court.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 654-55 (1965).  The 
Linkletter Court rejected the retroactive application theory of Blackstone and applied its decision 
prospectively, determining that the previously entered state convictions should not be disturbed.  Linkletter 
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639-40 (1965).  
75 United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967).   
76 440 U.S. 472 (1978).  For a detailed discussion of the evolution of the National Muffler factors, see infra 
notes 205-242 and accompanying text. 
77 Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); 
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).  See Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan 
v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1 (2004); Pharmaceutical Research and Mfrs. of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 
(2003); Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P. C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003); Washington State 
Dept. of Social and Health Services v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371 (2003). 
78 See John F. Coverdale, Court Review or Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 47 (1995); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864 (agencies should be given discretion to 
adjust policies of time without negative impact). 
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information, its continued understanding of a body of law and its effect, the consideration 
of the advancement of social norms, and the need to adjust its policies based on 
“appropriate political participation, in the administrative process.”79 
As between an agency and the courts, policy making should be viewed as the 
dominion of the agency.80 In that sense, it should make no difference that the agency 
previously advanced a policy that was inconsistent with its current policy.81 If 
inconsistency is a basis upon which a court can override a policy determination by an 
agency, then, in effect, the court creates policy.82 In such an instance, it is likely that the 
court “will often know substantially less about a specialized scheme than the responsible 
agency” and, as a result, may make a substantially less informed decision.83 
79 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517, 
518-19 (1989).  Of course, consistent positions over an extended period of time with different agency 
personnel and likely different political philosophies may add confidence to the strength of a particular 
position.  John F. Coverdale, Court Review or Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era,
64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 76 (1995).  However, it does not take into account the emergence of new ideas 
nor does it reflect changing social norms.  See generally, Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-
Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 297 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After 
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2102 (1990).  See also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517, 518-19 (1989) (modification by agency of 
position on a particular issue does not necessarily reflect on whether the initial interpretation was incorrect, 
but rather that a change of position by the agency reflect changes in social attitudes and/or the receipt of 
new information).  See Jet Serv., Inc. v. Hoffman, 420 F. Supp. 1300, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (“an 
administrative agency is not bound to an interpretation or guideline when it becomes evident from 
experience that changes are required to keep pace with present conditions.”);  See also Maxwell Co. v. 
NLRB, 414 F.2d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1969); Flotill Prods, Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 224, 230 (9th Cir. 1966); 
Dubrow v. SBA, 345 F. Supp. 4, 7 (C.D. Cal.1972).  
80 Courts make decisions on particular cases in relatively isolated circumstances while agencies make 
decisions based on a integrated policy consideration in the context of its delegated administrative 
responsibilities.  Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretative Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. ___ (2006), Loyola Law 
School (Los Angeles) Legal Research Series, Research Paper 2005-3, http://ssrn.com/abstract=665829, at 
3. 
81 Russell L. Weaver, A Foolish Consistency is the Hobgoblin of Little Minds, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 529, 558 
(1992). 
82 Russell L. Weaver, A Foolish Consistency is the Hobgoblin of Little Minds, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 529, 558 
(1992). 
83 Russell L. Weaver, A Foolish Consistency is the Hobgoblin of Little Minds, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 529, 558 
(1992). 
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 Congress, based on its nature, is unable to account for every change in social 
norm, technological advancement, or adjustment based on common law.  Instead, the 
administrative structure is in a far better position than courts to modify their thinking in 
light of the changed circumstances.84 Just because an agency modified its thinking does 
not modify its policy-making role.  An agency, therefore, should not be penalized for new 
interpretation based on changing conditions.  As long as the interpretation is reasonable 
in light of the factors for determining deference, a change in agency position should be 
encouraged, not discouraged through a factor favoring consistency.85 
There are, of course, arguments contrary to this view.  For example, inconsistent 
agency positions may be the hallmark of confusion by the agency of a correct 
interpretation, exhibiting a wavering concept of how a particular policy fits within a 
complex, statutory scheme.86 This is not insurmountable in light of the discretionary 
standard proposed under National Muffler. 
 Under National Muffler, a court is not required to accept any agency 
interpretation but one that is reasonable.  This standard permits a court to monitor agency 
interpretation through the remainder of National Muffler factors such as whether the 
 
84 Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2088 (1990).  The 
Supreme Court recognized the “changing conditions” rationale in Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary 
Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990).  In such circumstances, a change in agency position may make 
reasonable what was unreasonable before the changing circumstance.  Cass R. Sunstein, Law and 
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2103 n.149 (1990).     
85 Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2104 (1990).  
Professor Sunstein, however, would limit deference for “new departures” from longstanding interpretations 
based on the stare decisis rationale in judicial decisions.  Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After 
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2104 (1990).  Such a limitation, however, creates disincentive to  
exactly what an administrative agency is supposed to do that a court cannot – be flexible in light of 
changing circumstances.  Stare decisis is an important consideration in a judicial context, but determining 
what is reasonable in filling congressional gaps is not only necessary, but essential to agency expertise in 
creating a cohesive regulatory scheme. 
86 Russell L. Weaver, A Foolish Consistency is the Hobgoblin of Little Minds, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 529, 559 
(1992). 
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interpretation “harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its 
purpose.”87 Moreover, under National Muffler, a court can consider whether the 
guidance was a “a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute” and the 
manner in which the guidance evolved, as well as the degree of scrutiny Congress has 
devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of the statute.”88 
Since specific agencies are responsible for maintaining and enforcing a regulatory 
framework created by Congress, agencies should be given the necessary discretion to 
make those policy choices.89 If, indeed, consistency trumps policy, the agency “would 
lose its necessary discretionary flexibility to act in its field of expertise, and would 
become burdened by fossilized errors.”90 Moreover, agencies, in comparison to the 
courts, possess the expertise in fact-finding, policy making, and are more accountable to 
the electorate.91 More specifically, an administrative structure is in a better position to 
determine how to best implement a statute.92 
87 National Muffler, 440 U.S. at 477. 
88 Id. This scrutiny would be less meaningful under Chevron because Chevron requires more judicial 
restraint than National Muffler.
89 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837. 
90 Jet Serv., Inc. v. Hoffman, 420 F. Supp. 1300, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1976).  See Russell L. Weaver, A Foolish 
Consistency is the Hobgoblin of Little Minds, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 529, 558 (1992).  See also Jacobus 
tenBroek, Interpretive Administrative Action and the Lawmaker’s Will, 20 OR. L. REV. 206, 208-09 (1941): 
[T]he assumption that the administrator will seek to carry out his original intent, unmodified by 
subsequently occurring attitudes, circumstances, and needs, an assumption which is not borne 
out by the frequency with which administrative rulings and practices are changed and reversed.  
The doctrine implies a theory of administration which would impose upon administration a 
rigidity destructive of one of its most valuable qualities, for the doctrine hypothesizes the 
alteration will not be made in light of experience and against adjustment to developing needs. 
Id. 
91 Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2084 (1990).  
92 Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2088 (1990). 
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 This is particularly true in the tax area, an area in which Congress frequently 
delegates specific discretion to the Secretary of the Treasury93 and also provides general 
delegation authority to the Secretary to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the 
enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by 
reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue.”94 
In many instances, Congress delegates concepts, not rules, leaving it to an 
administrative agency to sort out the details.95 In such a case, the law, as written by 
Congress, creates certain fundamental interests by defining those rights and providing a 
mechanism to enforce those rights while comfortable in leaving the regulation of all other 
interests to agencies as are necessarily created to address specific interests.96 
For example, in response to the proliferation of tax shelters in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, Congress adopted the passive activity loss rules under § 469 of the Internal 
Revenue Code.97 Section 469 contains 4,484 words and defines the concepts of passive 
 
93 See E.g. 26 U.S.C. § 469(l) which provides that “[t]he Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may 
be necessary or appropriate to carry out provisions of this section.” 
94 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a). 
95 See e.g. Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 Duke L.J. 389, 398 (2003).  See 
also Bradford C. Mank, Suing Under § 1983:  The Future After Gonzaga University v. Doe, 39 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1417, 1459 (2003) (“it [is] common for Congress to write statutes that address broad goals and then 
delegate the remaining details to executive agencies.”).    The Internal Revenue Code contains over 1,000 
grants of regulatory authority, more than 250 grants of authority to prescribe appropriate regulations to 
carry out a specific statutory provision and a number which authorize the Secretary to establish tax policy.  
John F. Coverdale, Court Review or Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 35, 52 (1995); Lawrence Zelenak, Should Courts Require the Internal Revenue Service to 
Be Consistent?, 40 TAX L. REV. 411, 416 n.27 (1985). 
96 Roscoe Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action, 27 INTERNATIONAL J. OF ETHICS 150, 158 (1917). 
97 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).  Section 469 permits a taxpayer to deduct losses only if a 
taxpayer materially participates in that activity and “prevents a taxpayer from reducing income from wages, 
interest and dividends by tax sheltered losses incurred thorough partnerships.  Christopher M. 
Pietruszkiewicz, Of Summonses, Required Records, and Artificial Entities:  Liberating the IRS from Itself,
73 MISS. L.J. 921, 922 (2004).  
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activity, passive activity losses, and material participation.98 Moreover, Section 469 
provides special guidance for determining whether income or loss is from a passive 
activity for taxpayers who are involved in rental real estate activities, and an exception 
for the offsetting of a certain amount of rental real estate losses against active income.99 
Notwithstanding ten pages of statutory text, Congress explicitly provides in § 469(l) that 
“[t]he Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to 
carry out provisions of this section” and provides a list of items in which the Secretary 
shall interpret the statutory provision through regulation.100 
Indeed, if Congress delegates broadly to administrative agencies, it is necessary 
for the agency to have the ability to adjust its thinking without being penalized for a 
change in its interpretation.101 In such a case, agency competence is indeed the principal 
reason for a delegation in the first place and deference is particularly appropriate 
 
98 26 U.S.C. § 469(c), (d), (h). 
99 26 U.S.C. § 469(c), (d), (h), (i).  
100 26 U.S.C. § 469(l).  This section provides that the Secretary shall prescribe regulations to – 
(1) which specify what constitutes an activity, material participation, or active participation for 
purposes of this section, 
(2) which provide that certain items of gross income will not be taken into account in 
determining income or loss from any activity (and the treatment of expenses allocable to such 
income), 
(3) requiring net income or gain from a limited partnership or other passive activity to be treated 
as not from a passive activity, 
(4) which provide for the determination of the allocation of interest expense for purposes of this 
section, and 
(5) which deal with changes in marital status and changes between joint returns and separate 
returns. 
Id. 
101 Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2089 (1990) (“In 
light of the wide variety of contexts to which statutes must be applied, a degree of flexibility in 
implementation is quite healthy.”). 
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considering that it is Congress itself that delegated the role of statutory interpretation.102 
If an agency adopts a new position or alters a questionable, existing position, there exists 
a mechanism to regulate an agency’s irrational or illogical changes.103 Such arbitrary 
deviations may be remedied by the courts through defined factors bearing on whether an 
agency acted arbitrarily.     
 E. THE IRRELEVANCY OF A LONG STANDING AGENCY POLICY 
Judicial opinions seem to follow judicial opinions that seem to follow other 
judicial opinions.  Frequently, an opinion follows another without consideration of the 
legal landscape upon which the original opinion was based.  A longstanding 
interpretation without challenge or reaffirmance by an agency since an initial 
interpretation is no different in effect than a newly issued interpretation.  If a court is 
determining whether a policy is permissible, a change is policy should not be more or less 
permissible than the old policy104 
With the proliferation of agency guidance, the mere issuance without more should 
have no effect on whether deference is due.  Just as consistency should be irrelevant in a 
deference determination, whether a position held by an agency is longstanding is likewise 
irrelevant.  Because only a case and controversy provides standing to bring an action to 
challenge an interpretation of an agency, an interpretation issued long ago should not be a 
factor in determining whether deference should be due.105 The coincidence that 
 
102 Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2084 (1990). 
103 4 Kenneth Culp Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.11 at 38-39 (2d ed. 1983). 
104 John F. Coverdale, Court Review or Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 35, 76 (1995). 
105 The Anti-Injunction Act provides that “. . . no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or 
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the 
person against whom such tax was assessed.”  26 U.S.C. § 7421.  The Anti-Injunction Act has been 
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particular facts either arise or not immediately after an agency issues an interpretation 
should not have any bearing on whether the interpretation is entitled to deference.   
 F. NEW DEAL POLITICS AND ITS INFLUENCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE DEFERENCE 
In addition to the decline of the influence of Blackstone in 1946, the timing of the 
Skidmore decision lends support to its necessary abandonment in modern administrative 
law.  Skidmore was decided in 1944, a time of proliferation of new executive agencies as 
part of President Roosevelt’s New Deal.  Skidmore was solution to a political problem, 
not a legal problem.  It was a judicial reaction to the political climate of the 1940s and a 
self-created, feigned response to the New Deal, creating the appearance of deference but 
with open-ended factors to provide deference only when the views of an agency 
paralleled the views of the reviewing court.  The Attorney General’s Committee on 
Administrative Procedure recognized that the debate over administrative reform that 
 
"broadly construed to prohibit courts from granting equitable relief that would have the effect of enjoining 
the assessment or collection of taxes and to prevent judicial intermeddling in the tax collection process" and 
is designed to “to permit the United States to assess and collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial 
intervention, and to require the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund.”  See
Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736-737 (1974); Enochs v. Williams Packing & Nav. Co.,
370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962); United States v. First Family Mortgage Corp., 739 F.2d 1275, 1278 (7th Cir. 1984).  
Suits to restrain the collection of federal taxes are barred by § 7421(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (the 
Anti-Injunction Act) unless they fall within one of the exceptions to that Act. 
Moreover, the Declaratory Judgment Act  provides that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its 
jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an 
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such 
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force 
and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).  See Bob 
Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. at 742 n.15; Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 164 (1960).  The 
language prohibiting declaratory judgments with respect to federal taxes was added to the statute in 1935 
because of "[t]he congressional antipathy for premature interference with the assessment and collection of 
any federal taxes."  Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. at 732 n.7.  Moreover, the federal tax exception 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act is at least as broad as the Anti-Injunction Act.  Alexander v. 
“Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 759 n.10 (1974).  Thus, insofar as an action is barred by the Anti-
Injunction Act, it also would be barred by the Declaratory Judgment Act.  Combined, these statutes prevent 
a taxpayer from litigating an interpretation by the Internal Revenue Service unless that interpretation affects 
that particular taxpayer.  See Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue 
Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REV. 841, 852 (1992).  
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preceded and post-dated Skidmore was motivated by politics and not science.106 In 
essence, the fight over administrative reform that played out over the next decade was a 
referendum on the New Deal and not the most efficient way to provide a workable 
administrative structure, including the scope of judicial review107 The Supreme Court 
was not immune from these politics and, in fact, was a significant part of the political 
solution. 
 1. THE NEW DEAL 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected President in November 1932 and the New 
Deal was his attempt to counteract the Great Depression through the creation of various 
administrative agencies that would greatly influence the economy.108 The New Deal also 
created a political showdown between the scope of authority of these newly created 
executive agencies and the traditional role of courts.  The New Deal endorsed 
administrative self-sufficiency, perhaps even administrative sovereignty, while judicial 
independence resulted from over 100 years of separation between the role of the 
executive and the role of the courts, originally endorsed in Marbury v. Madison109 that it 
is for judges and only judges to “say what the law is.”110 
106 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1595 (1996). 
107 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1595 (1996). 
108 The establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 began the creation of the modern 
administrative agency and one-third of present day administrative agencies were created by 1900.  The 
modern administrative structure expanded exponentially under the New Deal.  Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., 
Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law:  A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Theory That Self-
Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1325 (2005); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., 
Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 456 
(1996); Henry J. Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019, 1022-25 (1977).  See Kenneth 
Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 1.04 at 24 (1958). 
109 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
110 Id. at 177. 
25
 Initially, a divided Supreme Court supported New Deal legislation.111 Legislative 
action attempted to curb the power of the administrative structure that the Supreme Court 
refused to keep in check.  For example, Senator Mills Logan introduced a bill in which he 
sought to restrict the scope of the administrative structure in favor of the judiciary by 
granting to the judiciary a broad appellate function in review of agency action.112 The 
American Bar Association’s Special Committee on Administrative Law also objected to 
the usurpation of authority by the administrative structure that was not explicitly subject 
to a system of checks and balances and over which the Supreme Court refused to limit its 
authority.113 
Shortly thereafter, with the reversal of the New Deal supporting position of 
Justice Roberts, a divided Supreme Court stuck down a number of President Roosevelt’s 
reforms that reflected this power struggle.114 In 1936, President Roosevelt was 
overwhelmingly re-elected.  With this popular endorsement, Justice Roberts again 
reversed course, upholding New Deal programs.115 With a perceived popular mandate in 
 
111 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Home Bldg. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
112 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1560 (1996). 
113 1933 American Bar Association Annual Report 199 (statement of Louis G. Caldwell). 
114 Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936) (holding unconstitutional a New York 
statute authorizing the fixing of women's wages); Carter v. Carter, 298 U.S. 238, 309-11 (1936) (labor 
provisions of Bituminous Coal Conservation Act held unconstitutional as regulating production and 
distribution of bituminous coal with only an indirect effect on interstate commerce); United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 68-72 (1936) (Agricultural Adjustment Act held invalid as invading reserved powers of states 
by regulating agricultural production within the states and as not a valid exercise of federal taxing and 
spending power under general welfare clause); Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-
42 (1935) (declaring unconstitutional the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing trade and 
industry codes); Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (pension provisions of 
Railroad Retirement Act held invalid as arbitrary); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) 
(declaring unconstitutional the President’s power to restrict interstate transportation of petroleum under the 
National Industrial Recovery Act).   
115 See e.g. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding Social Security Act); Steward Machine Co. 
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding Social Security Act); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 
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hand, President Roosevelt sought legislation to enlarge the Supreme Court, which had 
been invalidating key New Deal measures.116 Now, the Supreme Court narrowly 
supported New Deal legislation but Roosevelt nonetheless continued to press his Court-
packing initiative.117 The Supreme Court now supported New Deal initiatives and 
Roosevelt lost his Court-packing initiative; however, this incompatible combination 
invigorated the debate on judicial review of the now burgeoning administrative structure.  
 2. THE NEW DEAL AND THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Before this massive increase in the administrative structure, courts were the clear 
interpreters of statutory mandates, resolving ambiguity, filling gaps in legislation, and 
ultimately creating a common law.  The New Deal sought to change the power structure 
of interpretation, moving ambiguous resolution from the judiciary to the newly minted 
administrative structure.118 For the New Deal proponents, courts did not possess the 
expertise required to resolve the massive social problems indicative of the 1930s and 
1940s.119 And, more significantly, courts lacked the flexibility necessary to address those 
 
U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding authority of National Labor Relations Board); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding Washington state minimum wage statute). 
116 Roosevelt proposed his Court-enlarging plan to combat the anti-New Deal Supreme Court majority on 
February 5, 1937.  James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal 125 (1967). 
117 William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Supreme Court “Packing” Plan, in Essays on the 
New Deal 67, 74, 98 (Harold M. Hollingsworth ed., 1969). 
118 See FTC v. Ruberoid, 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952): 
The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last 
century and perhaps more values today are affected by their decisions than by those of all the 
courts, review of administrative decisions apart.  They also have begun to have important 
consequences on personal rights.  They have become a veritable fourth branch of the 
Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories much as the concept of a fourth 
dimension unsettles our three-dimensional thinking.  Courts have differed in assigning a place to 
these seemingly necessary bodies in our constitutional system. Administrative agencies have 
been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or quasi-judicial, as the occasion required, in order 
to validate their functions within the separation-of-powers scheme of the Constitution. 
119 James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 6 (1938).  See Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion:  
The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1496 (1983) (agencies were staffed by specialists and “the watchword 
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problems effectively by deciding issues resulting only from litigation on a case by case 
basis.120 
A shift in interpretative power created advantages in considering an entire 
statutory scheme, a component lacking in case by case review by courts in matters arising 
only in litigation.  The administrative structure, on the other hand, was not bound by the 
confines of a case in controversy or the narrow focus of the statute subject to litigation.  
Instead, resolution of statutory questions could focus on the broad impact of a statutory 
scheme without consideration of specific parties to litigation and distinct legal questions.  
The New Deal, therefore, created a power shift in ambiguous interpretation from the 
judiciary to the administrative structure and challenged the traditional notions of the 
system of checks and balances.121 
3. THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW THROUGH NEW DEAL LEGISLATION 
In 1937, New Deal opponents determined that the Supreme Court made is final 
reversal and was unresponsive to their criticism of the New Deal.122 Attention of New 
Deal opponents focused principally on legislation rather than litigation and the hallmark 
 
of administration became expertise, and the key doctrine of judicial review of administrative action became 
deference to that expertise.  Discretion and expertise became synonymous.”) 
120 Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2079 (1990). 
121 Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2088-89 (1990).  
Changed circumstances create ambiguity and agencies are uniquely positioned to resolve such ambiguities 
more timely that the case and controversy requirement for judicial review.  Cass R. Sunstein, Law and 
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2079, 2088 n.85 (1990); Douglas J. Feeney-
Gallagher, Battle on the Benches:  The Wagner Act and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, 1935-1942,
23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 503, 514 (2000) (The rise of powerful administrative agencies during the New Deal 
. . . sparked a counterattack in the lower federal courts against these dangerous tendencies in the 
deformation of the American system of governance.”) 
122 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1565 (1996). 
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of its legislative agenda was a heightened review of agency interpretation.123 With 
Roosevelt weakened politically based in large part on his failed Court-packing plan,124 he 
sought to reorganize the administrative structure to maintain his power.125 His weakness 
was evident in its legislative defeat.126 
While New Deal opponents sought to restrict administrative power, the opponents 
were not without their detractors.  In criticizing the view of the American Bar 
Association as “judicial overlordship,” Professor Gelhorn, a later member of the Attorney 
General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, noted -- 
The judiciary has by myriad ways sought to foster the illusions that it alone is 
capable of governing justly and dispassionately, that the entrusting of 
responsibilities to the administrative agencies is fraught with danger unless their 
exercise is ultimately subject to judicial supervision, and that the supremacy of 
law is synonymous with the supremacy of the judges. . . . [S] poradic, inexpert, 
and superficial dictation by the courts will never produce methods of 
administration which are both workable and fair. On the contrary, such dictation 
serves chiefly to obstruct the development of sound administrative processes. 
Those processes need the detailed study of persons who are conversant with the 
problems of government and who are sympathetic not only to private and 
individual interests but also to the realization of popular aspirations as recorded 
in laws adopted by representative legislatures.127 
In 1939, Senator Mills Logan again sponsored a bill to increase the availability of 
judicial review of agency decisions.128 While not an open war on the New Deal, its effect 
was an indirect assault on the scope of agency power through its focus on the standard of 
 
123 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1560 (1996). 
124 Roosevelt continued to pursue his Court-packing plan even after Justice Roberts again reversed course 
and supported Roosevelt’s New Deal programs.  William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
Supreme Court “Packing” Plan, in Essays on the New Deal 67, 74, 98 (Harold M. Hollingsworth ed., 
1969). 
125 James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal 214-15 (1967). 
126 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1585 (1996). 
127 Walter Gelhorn, The Improvement of Public Administration, 2 NAT’L LAW. GUILD Q., 20, 23 (1940). 
128 S. 915, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). 
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judicial review of agency action.129 This bill would change the scope of review from the 
previous “scintilla of evidence rule” to the “substantial evidence rule.”130 According to 
Senator Logan, a reviewing court had a limited role in reviewing of agency action 
inasmuch as the scope of review by a reviewing court was that the agency action was 
upheld if a “scintilla of evidence” supported the agency action.131 His proposal instead 
inserted more judicial control in which a court reviewing an agency action is required to 
uphold the agency action only if the decision of the agency was grounded in substantial 
evidence.132 
Opponents of the bill objected to the scope of judicial review, but as was 
customary during this period, their arguments were based principally on politics.  
According to the opponents of strict judicial control of administrative agencies, the 
judiciary still contained many judges opposed to New Deal reforms and a very strong 
anti-New Deal minority on the Supreme Court.133 This combination, at a minimum, 
could delay implementation of agency policy and consume agency resources and, at 
most, could paralyze agency efforts to shape policy.134 
Roosevelt vetoed the bill in late 1940.  Shortly thereafter, the Attorney General’s 
Committee on Administrative Procedure issued a report, fractured between liberals and 
 
129 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1631 (1996). 
130 84 CONG. REC. 7075 (1939). 
131 84 CONG. REC. 7075 (1939). 
132 84 CONG. REC. 7075 (1939). 
133 86 CONG. REC. 4530 (1940).  See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative 
Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1613-14 (1996). 
134 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1613-14 (1996). 
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conservatives with two proposed bills.135 The majority bill, supported by seven 
members, imposed little constraint on the administrative structure and did not increase 
the level of administrative review of agency action.136 The minority bill, supported by 
three conservative members, provided for enhanced judicial review of agency action, 
requiring reviewing courts to uphold agency action only if the agency action was 
supported “on the whole record, by substantial evidence.”137 The minority bill would 
therefore replace the “scintilla” rule with a congressionally mandated substantial 
evidence test.138 
Viewing some type of reform as inevitable, agencies sought to ease the impact of 
the legislation instead of simple opposition.139 The war weakened Roosevelt’s allies in 
Congress, losing forty-seven seats in the House and nine seats in the Senate in 1942.140 
135 United States Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final Report, S. Doc. 8, 77th 
Cong., 1st Sess. at 191.  The Report was issued on January 22, 1941 and a month after the House failed to 
override President Roosevelt’s veto.  George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative 
Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1632-34 (1996). 
136 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1634 (1996).  This bill was introduced in the Senate as S. 675.  S. 675, 
77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). 
137 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1632, 1636 (1996).  A third bill was proposed in the Attorney General’s 
Final Report that was supported by only one member that was even more restrictive of agency action than 
the minority bill.  United States Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final Report, 
S. Doc. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. at 248.  This bill was introduced as S. 918 and required a court to reject an 
agency’s factual findings that were “unsupported, upon the whole record, by substantial evidence having 
probative value.”  S. 918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).  Id. at § 805(4).  See George B. Shepherd, Fierce 
Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV.
1557, 1637 (1996). 
138 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1636 (1996).  The minority bill  also proposed public notice and 
comment rulemaking and the publication of all rules and regulations in the Federal Register.  George B. 
Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal Politics, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1635 (1996).  The minority bill was introduced as S. 674.  S. 674, 77th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1941). 
139 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1638 (1996). 
140 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1643 (1996). 
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Moreover, by 1943, public support of agencies was dwindling, regarded as the cause of 
increased inflation, unpopular agricultural price controls, and the rationing of goods.141 
The result was a congressional movement to restrict New Deal programs not directly 
associated with the war effort, all without major opposition from the Administration.142 
Nonetheless, Roosevelt won reelection to a fourth term in 1944. 
 In 1944, the ABA drafted a new reform bill that granted significant judicial 
review of agency action, providing that a court could reject an agency decision that was 
“arbitrary or capricious [or] unsupported by competent, material, and substantial 
evidence, upon the whole record as reviewed by the court.”143 This bill was revised and 
introduced as S. 7.  After extensive negotiations and the death of President Roosevelt, 
President Truman signed the Administrative Procedure Act of June 11, 1946.144 New 
Deal proponents, New Deal opponents, and the administrative agencies themselves were 
not especially pleased about the new legislation because no group received precisely what 
they sought.  Significantly, all interested groups were apprehensive about how courts 
would interpret the new legislation.145 
141 Otis L. Graham, Jr., The Democratic Party:  1932-1945, in 3 History of U.S. Political Parties 1939, 1953 
(Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. ed., 1973); Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Procedure, 1943 
A.B.A. Ann. Rep. 251. 
142 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1613-14 (1996). 
143 S. 2030, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(f) (1944). 
144 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1674 (1996). 
145 S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.  App. B (1945), reprinted in Administrative Procedure Act:  
Legislative History, 79th Congress, 1944 - 46 at 224 (1946); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The 
Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1674 (1996). 
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 Two years after Skidmore, the Administrative Procedure Act reflected the same 
attraction of Skidmore.146 The Administrative Procedure Act was the culmination of a  
fight for the New Deal.  As initially conceived, administrative reform was to restrict the 
power of New Deal administrative agencies.147 Just as in Skidmore, the Administrative 
Procedure Act represented a compromise between judicial interpretative considerations 
and the administrative policy structure.148 The compromise was to “effectuate[] needed 
reforms in the administrative process and at the same time preserve[] the effectiveness of 
laws which are enforced by the administrative agencies of the Government.149 The 
Administrative Procedure Act reconciled the two competing political interests of judicial 
 
146 The Administrative Procedure Act was approved on May 24, 1946 without a recorded vote and without 
dissent.  The Administrative Procedure Act was signed by President Truman on June 11, 1946. United 
States Department of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 5 (1947). 
147 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1560 (1996).  In particular, the administrative reform movement was 
designed to limit the power of the National Labor Relations Board and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  Id. A 1938 ABA Report sought additional judicial controls on the administrative structure in 
large part based on the pro-labor and anti-business slant of the National Labor Relations Board and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.  Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 1938 
American Bar Association’s Annual Report 342.  See B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The 
Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1590-91 (1996).  
148 The Administrative Procedure Act was designed to address four principal purposes:  
1. To require agencies to keep the public currently informed of their organization, procedures 
and rules . . . .   
2. To provide for public participation in the rule making process. . . .   
3. To prescribe uniform standards for the conduct of formal rule making . . . and adjudicatory 
proceedings . . . , i.e., proceedings which are required by statute to be made on the record after 
opportunity for an agency hearing. . . .   
4. To restate the law of judicial review. . . .  
United States Department of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 9 
(1947). 
149 United States Department of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 5 
(1947). 
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independence in statutory interpretation with the administrative self-sufficiency sought 
by proponents of the New Deal at a time of political stalemate. 150 
The APA was the armistice of a fierce political battle over administrative 
reform.  The forces in the battle fought over the degree to which Congress 
would permit Roosevelt, through his agencies, to implement the New Deal.151 
It is not surprising, therefore, that because the battle over administrative reform 
was political rather than principled, groups that favored or disfavored reform of the 
administrative structure paralleled those groups that favored or disfavored the New 
Deal.152 
4. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The Administrative Procedure Act lends support to according some weight to 
agency guidance but does not position an administrative agency or the court as a super-
legislature.  In 1941, the question was how much independent judicial judgment is the 
right amount of independent judgment.  Three choices, of course, exist.  First is that 
administrative action is reviewed by a court de novo and a judicial review is one in which 
a court answers with what it believes is the “right interpretation.”153 Second is judicial 
abdication to interpretations of administrative agencies.  Third, and most properly, is 
whether an “administrative interpretation has substantial support.”154 
150 Conservatives could defeat liberal legislation and President Roosevelt could veto the conservative 
agenda.  George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New 
Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1675 (1996). 
151 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1680 (1996). 
152 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise:  The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges From New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1680 (1996). 
153 S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1941).     
154 Id. S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1941).   
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 The Administrative Procedure Act favors the later view – “[w]here the statute is 
reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court may accept that of the 
administrative body.”155 Such a view would further the goal of “achiev[ing] relative 
uniformity in the administrative machinery of the Federal Government.”156 The 
Administrative Procedure Act does provide that “the reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine 
the meaning or applicability of the terms of any agency action.”157 Specifically, a 
reviewing court shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law. . . .”158 The standard of review thus favors judicial deference to 
agency determinations with a reviewing court imposing its own view only when an 
agency acts in an arbitrary or capricious manner. 
 The rationale for deference is based on the standing of the administrative agency 
that it is “not merely as the opinion of some men or even of a lower tribunal, but as the 
 
155 S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1941).   
156 United States Department of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 5 
(1947). 
157 United States Department of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 
107 (1947). 
158 United States Department of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 
107 (1947).  Moreover, a reviewing court “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be: 
(1) “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;”  
(2) “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;” 
(3) “without observance of procedure required by law;  
(4) “unsupported by substantial evidence in any case subject to [specific] requirements . . . or 
otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or  
(5) “unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the 
reviewing court.” 
Id.  Finally, a review court may “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed”  Id. 
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opinion of the body especially familiar with the problems dealt with by the statute and 
burdened with the duty of enforcing it. This may be because legislation deals with 
complex matters calling for expert knowledge and judgment.”159 When dealing with 
multifaceted, competing policy interests, administrative agencies can consider a 
particular issue in the context of the statutory scheme while courts consider a particular 
issue in the context of the precise issue originating in litigation. 
 The Administrative Procedure Act was a political war on the New Deal and the 
resulting compromise, without dissent, was a peace treaty that favored the terms of the 
New Deal proponents.160 Skidmore represents a similar compromise – without opposition 
by a partisan Supreme Court -- that provides deference, but in circumstances that 
persuade a court that the reasoning of the agency is sound.  The open-ended factor 
 
159 S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1941).  The Administrative Procedure Act was based, in part, 
the Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure.  Antonin Scalia, Judicial 
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 513 (1989).  Further, Chevron 
notes that agency officials have more expertise than court.  “In these cases, the Administrator's 
interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to 
deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed 
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expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do 
so . . . .   Id. at 837; Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretative Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. ___ (2006), Loyola 
Law School (Los Angeles) Legal Research Series, Research Paper 2005-3, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=665829, at 6) (administrative agency possess technical expertise and interpret 
specific statutory provision by taking into account an entire statutory scheme).  Cf. Linda Galler, Emerging 
Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REV. 841, 852 (1992) (“While the IRS 
undoubtedly employs many intelligent, experienced, and accomplished individuals, it is far from clear that 
the individual or collective dexterity of this group distinguishes it from tax practitioners in the private 
sector.”).  
There is, however, a body of legislative history that suggests that judicial independence was preserved in 
the Administrative Procedure Act at the expense of administrative self-sufficiency.  See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2080-81 and n.46 (1990) (“the APA 
appeared to endorse judicial control of administration and to direct courts to interpret statutes on their 
own.”) (text and underlying purpose of the APA “argue in favor of independent review.”).  See also  
Administrative Procedure Act, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 305 (1946) (remarks of Sen. 
McCarran, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm.) ("I desire to emphasize the . . . provisions for judicial 
review. . . .”; id. at 217 (Report of the Senate Judiciary Comm.) ("the enforcement of the bill, by the 
independent judicial interpretation and application of its terms, is a function which is clearly conferred 
upon the courts. . . . Judicial review is of utmost importance. . . .”) 
160 Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 448 (1986). 
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analysis, however, provides refuge for an interpretation of an administrative agency only 
if it is persuasive to a reviewing court.  In this sense, a court weighs an argument and the 
more persuasive one wins.  That simply does not provide deference to an administrative 
agency.  It does not suggest, however, that Chevron deference should apply to informal 
agency guidance.  It nonetheless is significant as a starting point in re-formulating an 
intermediate deference standard. 
 G. DEFERENCE UNDER CHEVRON 
For 20 years, courts have looked to Chevron to determine the extent to which a 
policy interpretation by an agency should be respected.  In Chevron, the Supreme Court 
upheld a determination of the Environmental Protection Agency as a permissible 
construction of the Clean Water Act of 1977, reversing the decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.  The Chevron Court held:  
[T]he Court of Appeals misconceived the nature of its role in 
reviewing the regulations at issue.  Once it determined, after its own 
examination of the legislation, that Congress did not actually have 
an intent . . . the question before it was not whether in its view the 
concept is “inappropriate” . . . but whether the Administrator’s view 
that it is appropriate in the context of this particular program is a 
reasonable one.”161 
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court rejected the de novo review employed 
by the D.C. Circuit (and permitted under Skidmore), concluding that Congress did not 
have an “intent” regarding the matter under consideration.162 Rather than using a de novo 
standard, a court must consider the determination of the agency charged with the 
administration of the statute at issue and give such a determination deference provided 
 
161 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845. 
162 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
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that the interpretation is permissible.163 As a result, the Supreme Court created what 
Kenneth W. Starr called the Chevron “two step” where a court first determines whether 
Congress has directly spoken on the issue and if not, whether the agency interpretation is 
a permissible one.164 
In the first step, the courts must consider whether Congress intended to resolve 
the matter.  According to Chevron, a court considers whether Congress “has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.”165 Step one, thus, requires a two-fold inquiry. 
The initial inquiry under step one is whether the inquiry is answered directly by the plain 
language of the statute.166 The inquiry ends if the intent of Congress is found in the plain 
language of the statute. As a result, the intent of Congress must be followed.  However, if 
the plain language fails to resolve the matter, a second inquiry under step one examines 
the legislative history of the statute.167 Again, the inquiry ends if the legislative history 
deciphers congressional intent which must be followed.  Thus, if either inquiry under step 
one reveals Congressional intent, the inquiry ends without consideration of step two.168 
As a result, if the answer to the precise question is resolved through step one and 
if the interpretation of the agency is consistent with Congressional intent, the 
interpretation of the agency is upheld.  If, however, an administrative construction is 
contrary to the intent of Congress, a court should reject the construction offered by the 
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agency.169 
Step one resolves all issues in which Congress expresses its intention.  The second 
step addresses matters in which Congress did not express its intention on a particular 
issue or its intention is ambiguous.  As a result, step two directs a court to determine 
whether the agency’s interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute.170 
The Court uses the term “permissible,” but it is apparent that this is intended to be 
synonymous with “reasonable.”171 The Court considers whether the interpretation of the 
agency is reasonable, and “the court does not simply impose its own construction.”172 As 
a result, the primary impetus of Chevron is a choice between two branches of 
government.173 In interpreting rules promulgated by Congress and not answered by 
Congressional intent as expressed in the plain language of the statute or expressed 
through legislative history, Chevron favors the Executive Branch over the Judicial 
 
169 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 n.9.  See, e.g., FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 
U.S. 27, 32 (1981); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117-18 (1978); FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 
745-746 (1973); Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 
(1965); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965); Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 
U.S. 358, 369 (1946); Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 16 (1932); Webster v. Luther, 163 U.S. 
331, 342 (1896). 
170 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
171 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a 
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency”).  See INS v. Yong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 
139, 144 (1981); Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421, U.S. 60, 87 (1975).  See also 
Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 288 (1986). 
172 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.  See  Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. 
ON REG. 283, 288 (1986). 
173 Policy choices should be left to the discretion of an agency and not formulated by the judiciary.  
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.  The Court stated – “[F]ederal judges – who have no constituency – have a duty 
to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.  The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom 
of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not 
judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches." TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153, 195 (1978).”  Id.
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Branch.174 Under Chevron, choices of interpretation of statutes are necessary and those 
choices involve policy determinations.175 
The second step in Chevron focuses on determining whether an agency 
overstepped its authority.  The application of step two instructs courts to limit its 
determination to whether the policy choice made by the agency is permissible.176 Once a 
court reaches the second step in Chevron, an administrative interpretation is likely to 
prevail.177 Under this second step, the primary role is that of the agency in which the 
agency adopts what it considers the optimum solution, and the secondary role is that of 
 
174 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.  See Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings:  Reconciling 
Divergent Standards, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1051 (1995).  See also Cass R. Sunstein, Law and 
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2097-88 (1990); Laurence H. Silberman, The 
Intersection of Law and Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 822-24 (1990).  A number of scholars, 
however, argue that Chevron does not accomplish a shift in interpretative power from the judiciary to 
administrative agencies.  Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia:  The Unproven Case of 
Increased Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 637, 639 (1996); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 981 (1992); Russell L. Weaver, Some 
Realism About Chevron, 58 MO. L. REV. 129, 181 (1993); Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let 
Your Babies Grow Up to be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 562 (1994).  While Chevron-type 
deference should not apply to revenue rulings issued by the Internal Revenue Service because the nature of 
the guidance is informal, research suggests that courts of appeals accepted the determination of the Internal 
Revenue Service in revenue rulings 92% of the time in the eleven years prior to Chevron but only 71% of 
the time in the eleven years post Chevron. Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia:  The 
Unproven Case of Increased Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 637, 639 (1996).  
While the point is well-taken, this research self-admittedly was a small part of a larger point and used 
limited data in response to an earlier article with 21 cases as part of the data set pre-Chevron and 13 cases 
post-Chevron.
175 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.  Specifically, the Court determined: 
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, 
really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice 
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail.  In such a case, federal judges – who 
have no constituency – have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.  
The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle 
between competing views of the public interest are not judicial once:  “Our Constitution vests 
such responsibilities in the political branches.”  TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978). 
Id. at 866. 
176 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.  See John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain:  Judicial review of 
Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 29, 44 (2003); Thomas W. 
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 978-79 (1992); Mark Seidenfeld, A
Syncopated Chevron:  Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of 
Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 96-97 (1994).  
177 Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron:  Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHIC.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 
1262 (1997). 
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the courts in which a court may review the solution of an agency and overturn it only if 
unreasonable.178 
Chevron was followed by two additional cases that set the boundaries for 
application of Chevron deference.  In Christensen v. Harris County, the Supreme Court 
restricted Chevron deference in a case involving an opinion letter of the Department of 
Labor.179 The Court held that Chevron deference did not apply because the interpretation 
by the Department of Labor was “an interpretation contained in an opinion letter,” not an 
interpretation “arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.”180 As such, the Court held that “[i]nterpretations such as those in opinion 
letters – like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and 
enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law – do not warrant Chevron-style 
deference.”181 
In Mead, the United States Customs Service urged Chevron deference in the 
issuance of a tariff classification ruling.182 According to the Customs Service, a letter 
ruling is “the official position of the Customs Service with respect to the particular 
 
178 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837. 
[T]he Administrator’s interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly 
competing interests and is entitled to deference:  the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, 
the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasonable fashion, and the decision involves 
reconciling conflicting policies.  Congress intended to accommodate both interests, but did not 
do so itself on the level of specificity presented by these cases.  Perhaps that body consciously 
desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking that those with great 
expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better 
position to do so: and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the 
question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the 
agency.  For judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred. 
Id. at 837.  See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981). 
179 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
180 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. 
181 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. 
182 Mead, 533 U.S. at 221. 
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transaction or issue described therein and is binding on all Custom Service personnel.”183 
Moreover, the “principle” cited in the ruling “may be cited as authority in the disposition 
of transactions involving the same circumstances.”184 
While Mead resulted in further restricting application of Chevron deference, the 
Court focused principally on whether Congress intended Chevron to apply.185 Mead cites 
two factors to determine whether Chevron deference should apply.  First, “Congress 
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law…”186 
Second, “the agency interpretation claiming deference [was] promulgated in the exercise 
of that authority.”187 Courts must then determine whether Congress intended to “delegate 
general authority to make rules with force of law.”188 Mead reasons that absent the 
express delegation, a court must consider its general authority.189 
While the decisions of the Supreme Court in Christensen and Mead “continue[] to 
leave open the possibility of granting Chevron deference to agency positions reached 
 
183 Mead, 533 U.S. at 222 n.1 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 177.9(a) (2000). 
184 Mead, 533 U.S. at 222 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 177.9(a) (2000)).     
185 Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretative Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. ___ (2006), Loyola Law School (Los 
Angeles) Legal Research Series, Research Paper 2005-3, http://ssrn.com/abstract=665829, at 5 (Mead 
further restricts Chevron and intensifies judicial review and promotes “micromanagement of agency 
decisions.”).  See John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain:  Judicial review of Treasury Regulations 
and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 29, 49 (2003); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond 
Accountability:  Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 545 
(2003).   
186 Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27. 
187 Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. 
188 Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 (quoting Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. at 837, 843-44 (1984)). Under I.R.C. § 7805(b), Congress made an express delegation to the Internal 
Revenue Service to utilize its discretion in determining whether to apply a ruling without retroactive effect.  
26 U.S.C. § 7805(b). 
189 Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.  Guidance issued under § 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code does not have the 
force of law and regulations issued under that authority is a general grant of authority as opposed to a 
specific grant of authority. 
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outside of notice-and-comment rulemaking,”190 informal guidance should be construed 
not under the Chevron deference standard applicable to formalized guidance, but rather 
something more than the “litigation position” persuasiveness of Skidmore. National 
Muffler provides an appropriate level of review.191 
H. DEFERENCE UNDER NATIONAL MUFFLER 
In National Muffler, the Supreme Court offered an alterative view of deference to 
agency guidance.  While considering the deference due to a general authority tax 
regulation of the Department of Treasury, the Court considered a list of factors that 
diverge from the ill-defined deference factors under Skidmore.192 In National Muffler,
the Court considered whether the guidance “harmonizes with the plain language of the 
statute, its origin, and its purpose.”193 Moreover, the Court concluded that greater 
deference was due if the guidance was issued as “a substantially contemporaneous 
construction of the statute by those presumed to have been aware of congressional 
intent.”194 If the guidance is not contemporaneously issued, then a court should consider 
the manner in which it evolved in order to determine if deference is warranted.195 
Finally, the Court considered appropriate an inquiry into the “length of time the 
 
190 John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain:  Judicial review of Treasury Regulations and Revenue 
Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 29, 54 (2003). 
191 A number of cases and scholars argue that informal guidance and general authority regulations are 
entitled to no more than Skidmore deference.  John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain:  Judicial 
Review of Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39 (2003); Mitchell 
M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 731 (2002); Robinson 
v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 44 (Vasquez, J. dissenting).  Others argue that at least general authority 
regulations issued under § 7805 should be entitled to Chevron deference.  Hospital Corp. of America v. 
Commissioner, 348 F.2d 136 (6th Cir. 2003).  
192 440 U.S. 472 (1978). 
193 National Muffler, 440 U.S. at 477. 
194 Id.
195 Id.
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[guidance] has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the 
Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the 
regulation during subsequent re-enactments of the statute.”196 
It appears that both the consistency factor and the length of time a policy has, in 
effect, permeated from Skidmore. Length of time, just as consistency in position, would 
favor applying deference to administrative guidance while the inverse would favor an 
independent judicial assessment.  For the same reasons described above, the consistency 
of an agency interpretation and the length of time an agency has followed a particular 
position should not be part of the deference equation.197 The other National Muffler 
factors do, however, provide a valid framework for considering the extent to which 
agency guidance should be given deferential treatment. 
 The first National Muffler factor – whether the guidance “harmonizes with the 
plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose” – is broader than the first step 
under Chevron. In step one under Chevron, the inquiry is whether the plain language of 
the statute provides an answer to the question.198 If the plain language of a statute 
provides an answer, the plain language is followed and a court never arrives at step two – 
a step that favors administrative discretion as long as the administrative determination is 
reasonable.199 
Under National Muffler, the inquiry does not end with the “plain language” but 
looks at whether the administrative guidance harmonizes with the “plain language.”200 
196 Id.
197 See supra notes 74-112 and accompanying text. 
198 Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 288 (1986). 
199 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
200 National Muffler, 440 U.S. at 477. 
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While the harmonization with the plain language of a statute is a factor, it should be 
elevated above the remaining National Muffler factors.  Chevron requires a more 
formalized process for heightened deference than the more informal guidance at issue in 
National Muffler. If Chevron provides greater deference than National Muffler and 
administrative discretion is not part of the Chevron equation if the administrative 
construction is at odds with the plain language of the statute, certainly the less deferential 
standard under National Muffler cannot provide greater administrative discretion than 
Chevron.
It is appropriate, however, to consider the origin and purpose of the statute to 
determine whether deference is given an agency determination.201 While harmonization 
with the plain language should be a superior factor, harmonization with the origin and 
purpose does not hold the same cache.  Instead, harmonization with the origin and 
purpose should be considered discretionary chips just as they are considered in Chevron 
under step two to determine whether the administrative construction is reasonable.202 
Moreover, the Court concluded that greater deference was due if the guidance was 
issued as “a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed 
to have been aware of congressional intent.”203 In the tax area, agency officials are often 
 
201 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 61 (1803) (“[T]he 
most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of law, when the words are dubious, is by 
considering the reason and spirit of it; or the cause which moved the legislator to enact it.”).   
202 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.  See John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain:  Judicial review of 
Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 29, 44 (2003); Thomas W. 
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 978-79 (1992); Mark Seidenfeld, A
Syncopated Chevron:  Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of 
Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 96-97 (1994).  
203 National Muffler, 440 U.S. at 477.  See Erwin N. Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 
HARV. L. REV. 398, 405-06 (1941).  See also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976); 
NLRB v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 124 n.20 (1987); State of Ohio Dept. 
of Human Services v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Health Care Financing Administration, 862 
F.2d 1228, 1234-36 (6th Cir. 1988); Hydrocarbon Trading & Transp. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 89 F.R.D. 650, 
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involved in the legislative process and contemporaneous agency guidance assures or at 
least assumes that the officials issuing the agency guidance are familiar with the 
background of the enacted or amended statute.204 Because of this participation, a 
contemporaneous interpretation by agency officials is more likely to consider and 
implement legislative intent at the time of the enactment of the statutory provision.205 
On the other hand, guidance not contemporaneously issued does not likely have 
the benefit of knowledge of the specific implementation of particular congressional 
policy.  In such an instance, National Muffler correctly recognizes that if the guidance is 
not contemporaneously issued, then a court should look behind the guidance to consider 
the manner in which it was enacted to determine if deference is warranted.206 Finally, the 
National Muffler Court considered appropriate an inquiry into the “length of time the 
 
655 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Exxon Corp., 87 F.R.D. 624, 630-33 (D.D.C. 1980); Tenneco Oil Co. 
v. Department of Energy, 475 F. Supp. 299, 318 (D. Del. 1979); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 59 (1803) (“The fairest and most rational method to 
interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made. . . .”). 
204 See John F. Coverdale, Court Review or Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 75 (1995).  See also Bradford L. Ferguson, Reexamining the Nature and Role of 
Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing Realities of the Process, 67 TAXES 804, 812 (1989); 
Augustus v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 38, 43 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 585 (1941) (“The first 
administrative interpretation of a provision as it appears in a new act often expresses the general 
understanding of the time or the actual understanding of those who played an important part when the 
statute was drafted.”).  This factor has endured criticism because collective legislative intent is 
unachievable and even if the agency has been involved in the process, it does not ensure that the agency 
properly implements that intent.  Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue 
Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REV. 841, 877-80 (1992).  According to Professor Galler, “[b]y its very nature, the 
legislative process is one of mediation, compromise, and reconciliation of differing views and opinions.  If 
a court chooses to utilize legislative history in the process of interpreting a statutory ambiguity, it is the 
function of the court itself, not an administrative agency, to ascertain the purpose or intent of the 
legislature.”  Id. at 879. 
205 Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REV. 841, 
876-77 (1992).  See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer, 455 U.S. 16, 31 (1982) (participation in the 
legislative process by agency officials entitles interpretation by those agency officials to “great” deference). 
206 National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).  See Oakland County Bd. of 
Comm'rs v. United States Dep't of Labor, 853 F.2d 439, 444 (6th Cir. 1988)(Guy, J., dissenting); 
Hydrocarbon Trading & Transp. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 89 F.R.D. 650, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. 
Exxon Corp., 87 F.R.D. 624, 630-33 (D.D.C. 1980); Tenneco Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 475 F. 
Supp. 299, 318 (D. Del. 1979). 
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[guidance] has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the 
Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the 
regulation during subsequent re-enactments of the statute.” 
 Congressional scrutiny in reenactment of a statute also forms a valid basis on 
which deference to agency determinations may be given.  In many cases, this factor is 
neutral because congressional interpretation of a statutory provision provides little 
assistance in interpreting the intent of an earlier Congress.207 If, however, Congress was 
aware of agency policy through the issuance of agency guidance, reenactment should 
provide greater comfort that the agency was implementing congressional policy.  At a 
minimum, this tacit acceptance of agency guidance should provide greater discretion to 
the perspective of an agency on a particular matter.208 
While it may be argued that mere reenactment of a statute provides tacit approval 
of agency policy,209 it is unlikely if not impossible to assume that Congress is aware of all 
agency guidance in all administrative agencies.210 In the area of tax legislation, Congress 
enacts or modifies provisions with increasing frequency.211 In this circumstance, 
 
207 See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 185-86 (1994) (quoting Public Employees 
Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989)).  See also Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 
35 (1982); Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118, and n. 13 (1980). 
208 National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).  See John F. Coverdale, 
Court Review or Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 78 
(1995).   
209 Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 482 (1980).  See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 
(1959); McCughan v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488-492-93 (1931). 
210 Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX 
REV. 517, 566 (1994).  See Robert C. Brown, Regulations, Reenactment and the Revenue Acts, 54 Harv. L. 
Rev. 377 (1941); Erwin N. Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 398 
(1941); Randolph E. Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction, 49 Yale L.J. 600 
(1940).  
211 Between 1976 and 1989, Congress passed 138 bills modifying the federal tax laws.  David Burnham, A 
LAW UNTO ITSELF 303 (1989). Through the enactment of three Taxpayer’s Bills of Rights from 1988 to 
1998, Congress added some 140 non-substantive, procedural provisions to the Internal Revenue Code.  
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 (Taxpayer Bill of Rights), Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 
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deference based on congressional reenactment may have theoretical application but less 
practical significance.212 In this circumstance, heightened deference to agency 
consideration of an issue should not follow. 
 National Muffler evokes more of a balancing between the judicial independence 
and deferential treatment to informal agency guidance.  While Skidmore grants to an 
agency nothing more than the power to persuade, and Chevron upholds an interpretation 
of an agency as long as it is reasonable, National Muffler suggests a more balanced, 
meaningful deference standard.  This standard requires courts to consider close-ended 
factors to determine deference.   In adopting such a test, deference then fits within the 
broad parameters of more than a litigating position of an agency charged with 
administration of a particular area of the law and less than an abdication of the principles 
of Marbury v. Madison.213 
Stat. 3342, 3730 contained 21 provisions.  Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 
(1996) contained more than 40 provisions.  Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 
1998 (Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3), Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998) contained more than 70 
provisions.  See Leandra Lederman, Of Taxpayer Rights, Wrongs, and a Proposed Remedy, Tax Notes, 
May 22, 2000, 1133 n.2; Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, A Constitutional Cause of Action and the 
Internal Revenue Code:  Can You Shoot (Sue) the Messenger?, 54 SYR. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2004).  In 2004 
alone, the American Jobs Creation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1417 (2004), added 173 provisions 
to the Internal Revenue Code, amended another 274 provisions, created 44 major tax changes effective 
immediately and deferred the effective date to another 35 major tax changes until January 1, 2005, and 
included a 663 page conference report.  CCH Tax Briefing, American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 Special 
Report (Oct. 11, 2004).  Moreover, the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, 
118 Stat. 1165 (2004), amended 175 Internal Revenue Code Provisions and included a 150 page 
Conference Report.  CCH Tax Briefing, Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 Special Report (Oct. 4, 
2004). 
212 Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REV. 841, 
889 (1992). 
213 5 U.S. 137 (1803).  See Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992); EEOC v. Arabian 
American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 193 (1969); 
Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1945).  
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 While National Muffler has been described as granting “serious deference” to an 
administrative agency,214 it appears that the true range of deference standards is that 
Skidmore provides no deference, Chevron provides strong deference, and National 
Muffler simply provides deference.  Under National Muffler, a court should defer to an 
interpretation of an agency if the interpretation “implements the congressional mandate in 
some reasonable manner.”215 This is because “Congress has delegated to the [Internal 
Revenue Service], not the courts, the task of prescribing ‘all needful rules and regulations 
for the enforcement’ of the Internal Revenue Code.216 Under this standard, discretion 
(and deference) is given to those responsible for implementing the rules and helps to 
assure consistency under a statutory scheme with “limitless factual variations.”217 
Deference, and more particularly, an appropriate level of deference, provides a suitable 
balance between agencies and courts and favors agency construction over judicial 
independence as long as the choice of the agency for implementation is reasonable under 
the statutory scheme at issue.218 
I. ORIGINS OF NATIONAL MUFFLER 
The deference to general authority regulations in National Muffler is an outgrowth 
of the deference to a ruling of the Internal Revenue Service eleven years earlier in United 
 
214 Ellen Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 51, 77 (1996). 
215 National Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476-77 (1979).  See United States v. 
Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973); United States v.  Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967). 
216 National Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979), quoting 26 U.S.C. § 
7805(a).  See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. at 307.  See Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. at 484 
(“Although the Service’s interpretive rulings do not have the force and effect of regulations, . . . we give an 
agency’s interpretations and practices considerable weight where they involve the contemporaneous 
construction of a statute and where they have been in long use.”). 
217 National Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).  See United States v. 
Moore, 95 U.S. 760 (1878). 
218 See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2090 (1990). 
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States v. Correll.219 The decision of the Supreme Court in Correll was issued in 1967 
and National Muffler in 1978, decades after Skidmore in 1944.  National Muffler was an 
extension of Correll and provides support for expanding the application of National 
Muffler deference beyond general authority regulations to more informal agency 
guidance.220 
In Correll, the Supreme Court, in considering whether the Internal Revenue 
Service is entitled to deference regarding a ruling, fails to cite Skidmore or its factors, 
instead focusing on an analysis consistent with a number of the factors it later employed 
in National Muffler. In Correll, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
Commissioner implemented the “congressional mandate in a reasonable manner” and 
weighed that inquiry in favor of the Commissioner because the interpretation of the 
Commissioner “long continued without substantial change” even after Congress 
substantially reenacted the statute.221 
Correll foreshadowed the deference standard of National Muffler and heightened 
the deference under Skidmore commenting that “[i]mprovements might be imagined. But 
we do not sit as a committee of revision to perfect the administration of the tax laws” 
 
219 United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967). 
220 A revenue ruling describes a set of hypothetical facts, apply those facts to the law, and offer a legal 
conclusion for all taxpayers concerning what the Internal Revenue Service believes the result would be in 
such a situation. See Rev. Proc 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814.  “Revenue rulings . . . are published to provide 
precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases, and may be cited and relied upon for that purpose.”   
Id. Moreover, revenue rulings involve substantive law and reflect conclusions responsive to the facts 
addressed in the ruling.  Id. Finally, a revenue ruling is an official interpretation by the Service and is 
published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.  Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(6).  See Christopher M. 
Pietruszkiewicz, Does the Internal Revenue Service Have a Duty to Treat Similarly-Situated Taxpayers 
Similarly?, 74 U. CINN. L. REV. ___ n. ___ (2006). 
221 United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 305-07.  See Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938); Fribourg Nav. 
Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272 (1966).  Cf. National Muffler v. United States, 440 U.S. at 477 that 
considers whether the guidance “harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its 
purpose[,]” . . . the “length of time the [guidance] has been in effect, . . . the consistency of the 
Commissioner’s interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during 
subsequent re-enactments of the statute.” 
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because it is the “Commissioner, not the courts that Congress has delegated to ability to 
prescribe ‘all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement’ of the Internal Revenue 
Code.”222 The Supreme Court defined the role of the judiciary -- “[t]he role of the 
judiciary in cases of this sort begins and ends with assuring that the Commissioner’s 
regulations fall within his authority to implement the congressional mandate in some 
reasonable manner.”223 
Davis v. United States224 and Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner,225 
follow the tax trend of utilizing the deference standard under National Muffler instead of 
applying Chevron or Skidmore. In deciding the amount of deference given a revenue 
ruling issued by the Internal Revenue Service, the Supreme Court in Davis sidestepped 
Chevron and Skidmore, instead focusing on three of the National Muffler standards, 
considering whether the revenue ruling was a contemporaneous construction of the 
statute, the length of time the revenue ruling was in effect, and the degree of scrutiny 
Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of the statute.226 
Cottage Savings followed Davis in which the Commissioner sought deference to a 
general authority regulation under Chevron.227 In applying National Muffler to the 
regulation to determine whether the regulation merited deference, the Court again simply 
 
222 United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. at 306-07; 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a). 
223 United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. at 307. 
224 495 U.S. 472 (1990). 
225 499 U.S. 554 (1991). 
226 Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. at 484.  
227 Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. at 560-61.  
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ignored Chevron and did not apply Chevron to the regulation determining that it was not 
applicable. 228 
J. DEFERENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF A STATUTORY SCHEME 
Deference to agency guidance should be based, in large part, on a statutory 
scheme devised by Congress229 and whether that scheme delegates authority to an 
agency.230 The Internal Revenue Code is a good example.  Section 7805(a) provides: 
“[t]he Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the 
enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be 
necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal 
revenue.”231 
In short, I.R.C. § 7805(a) prescribes a general grant of authority provided by 
Congress to enforce the internal revenue laws.232 Through this authority, the Internal 
 
228 Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. at 560-62.  
229 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 513 
(1989) (citing Process Gas Consumers Group v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 694 F.2d 778, 791 
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting Constance v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 672 F.2d 990, 995 (1st Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 905 (1983)); Ford Motor Credit. Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566-68 
(1980)).  See Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretative Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. ___ (2006), Loyola Law 
School (Los Angeles) Legal Research Series, Research Paper 2005-3, http://ssrn.com/abstract=665829, at 8  
(judges do not have a responsibility to administration of a complex statutory scheme; they are responsible 
to resolved specific cases with specific factual backgrounds). 
230“[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of 
that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its 
judgments.”  Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
511, 516 (1989) (citing Process Gas Consumers Group v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 694 F.2d 778, 
791 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting Constance v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 672 F.2d 990, 995 (1st 
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. at 865.905 (1983)); Ford Motor Credit. Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 
566-68 (1980)). 
231 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a).  The Secretary of the Treasury has delegated the authority to the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue to issue private letter rulings.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7805-1(a).  
232 With the exception of tax law, congressional grants of authority similar to a grant delegated under § 
7805 carry the force and effect of law and are subject of Chevron-type deference.  See Thomas W. Merrill 
and Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law:  The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 467 (2002).  See also United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999).  In tax law, specific 
grants of rulemaking authority are provided under a specific code provision providing for a delegation. 
Irving Salem, Ellen P. Aprill, & Linda Galler, ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on 
Judicial Deference, Tax Lawyer, Vol. 57, No. 3 at 728-29.  I do not contest this assertion for purposes of 
this article and do not argue that informal guidance under § 7805 should be accorded Chevron deference. 
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Revenue Service issues various types of informal guidance including revenue rulings, 
revenue procedures, notices, announcements, and private letter rulings. 
 Section 7805 provides not only that the Secretary proscribe regulations under this 
general grant of authority but also any rules necessary to carry out the provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code.  While the amount of deference given does not and should not be 
equal, it does mean that Congress delegated that authority to the Commissioner and not 
the courts.233 Such informal guidance, while not meriting the deference accorded 
regulations that carry the force of law and subject to notice and comment, should be 
given meaningful deference based on the delegation such as under § 7805(a) – a standard 
consistent with deference under National Muffler.
III. CONCLUSION 
The degree of deference accorded to the interpretation of a statute by an agency 
charged by Congress with administering the statute has been “like quicksand . . . 
constantly shifting [and] steadily sinking.”234 Courts have been instructed to review 
agency interpretations of statutes de novo,235 to give “some deference” to an 
interpretation by an agency,236 and to defer to an interpretation of an agency as long as it 
is reasonable.237 Moreover, courts have been directed to give “considerably less 
deference” to an interpretation of an agency if that interpretation conflicts with a prior 
 
233 United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1967) (“Congress has delegated to the Commissioner, 
not to the courts, the task of prescribing all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of the Internal 
Revenue Code.”) 
234 Ohio State Univ. v. Secretary, 996 F.2d 122, 123 n. 1 (6th Cir.1993), vacated on other grounds, 512 
U.S. 1231 (1994). 
235 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944). 
236 FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986). 
237 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984). 
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agency interpretation238 and that they should not follow an interpretation of an agency 
that violates specific statutory language or is otherwise contrary to law.239 
The focus of discussion has been the degree to which formal agency guidance 
carrying the force of law should be given deference.  However, informal agency guidance 
accounts for an overwhelming component of guidance issued by administrative agencies.  
It is, therefore, appropriate to consider the impact of informal guidance and to utilize a 
standard that recognizes the expertise of those charged by Congress with implementation 
of a statutory scheme.   
 Skidmore was based on political compromise that “awards” deference to 
administrative agencies if and only if the interpretation corresponds with what a court 
believes is the best reading of a statute.  Moreover, Skidmore lacks a solid foundation 
inasmuch as the open-ended factor analysis is based in large part on principles of law 
consistent with the state of the law in the 1930s and 1940s.  The law has itself been 
modernized but the re-emergence of the Skidmore standards suggests that the deference 
standard has not.   
 Skidmore grants an agency nothing more than the power to persuade, allowing 
courts to substitute their judgment for the judgment of an administrative agency if its 
reading of a statute is a better reading of the statute.  National Muffler deference, on the 
other hand, permits a court to substitute its judgment for the judgment of an agency, but 
only if the reading of an agency does not implement a congressional mandate in a 
reasonable manner.  National Muffler, therefore, is a more appropriate balance between 
the judicial independence and deferential treatment to informal agency guidance.  In 
 
238 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447 (1987). 
239 Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994). 
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applying complex statutory schemes, greater understanding yields better results and 
deference is an appropriate vehicle to utilize that understanding.  
 
